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Thinking as Communication 
 
Anna Sfard 




If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by scientists 
or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe, 
then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate 
context within which knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts 
from the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry 
to the relation between alternative standards of justification, and from 
there to the actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual 
history. 
   Richard Rorty1 
This book is a result of years-long attempts to change my own thinking about thinking, a task 
seemingly as improbable as breaking a hammer by hitting it with itself. In this unlikely 
undertaking, I have been inspired by Lev Vygotsky, the Byelorussian psychologist who devoted 
his life to “characterizing the uniquely human aspects of behavior,”2 and by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, the Austrian-British philosopher who insisted that no substantial progress can be 
made in this kind of endeavor unless the ways we talk, and thus think, about uniquely human 
“forms of life” undergo extensive revisions.    
My admittedly ambitious undertaking had modest beginnings. I was initially interested in 
learning and teaching of mathematics. Like many others before me, I was mystified by what 
could best be described as vagaries of human mind: whereas some people juggled numbers, 
polygons and functions effortlessly, some others were petrified at the very mention of numbers 
or geometric figures. Many of those who erred in their use of mathematical terms and 
techniques, seemed to err in a systematic, surprisingly similar ways. And then, there was the 
wonder of little children doing strange things with numbers before gradually becoming able to 
handle them the standard way. Above all, however, one could not but puzzle over why the 
persistent attempts to improve mathematics learning that have been lasting for many decades, if 
not centuries, did not seem to have any sustainable effect.  After years of grappling with these 
and similar phenomena, I realized that one cannot crack the puzzles of mathematical thinking 
without taking a good look at human thinking at large. I ended up wondering with Vygotsky 
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about how the unique human abilities “have been formed in the course of history” and about 
“the way they develop over an individual lifetime.”3   
 I soon discovered that whoever forays into this exciting territory dooms herself to an 
uneasy life. The first predicament of the student of human development is her being torn 
between two conflicting wishes: the wish to be scientific, whatever this word means to her, and 
the desire to capture the gist of those phenomena that are unique to humans. Whenever one of 
these needs is taken care of, the other one appears to be inherently unsatisfiable. Indeed, across 
history, the tug-of-war between the two goals, that of scientific reproducibility, rigor and 
cumulativeness, on the one hand, and that of doing justice to the complexity of the "uniquely 
human," on the other, resulted in the pendulum-like movement between the reductionist and the 
"gestaltist" poles. Reductionist theories, of which behaviorism is arguably the most extreme 
example, can boast the scientific operationality of their vocabulary,  but they eventually kill their 
object by throwing some of its vital parts away. Socioculturally-minded followers of Vygotsky, 
on the other hand, aware of the futility of the search conducted “under the lamp” rather than in 
those dark places where answers to their questions may really be hiding, fail to communicate 
their rich ideas clearly enough to give rise to well-defined programs of study.  
 Today, our sense of helplessness may well be at its most acute. New technologies afford 
unprecedented insights into human phenomena and produce high-resolution evidence of the 
utmost complexity of human forms of life. With audio- and video-recorders as standard 
ingredients of the researcher’s toolkit, the fleeting human action acquires permanence and 
becomes researchable in ways unknown to our predecessors. When carefully documented and 
transcribed, even the most common of everyday conversations prove to be a complex, 
multifaceted phenomenon, and an inexhaustible source of wonderings. This makes us as aware 
as ever of the fact that our ability to analyze and explain lags behind our ability to observe and to 
see. In this respect, our current situation is comparable to that of the 17th century scientists just 
faced with the newly invented microscope: Powerful, high-resolution lenses that reveal what was 
never noticed before are yet to be matched by an equally powerful analytic apparatus.  
 Inadequacies of conceptual tools are what Wittgenstein had in mind while complaining, 
more than half a century ago, about the state of research on human thinking. “[T]he concepts of 
psychology are just everyday concepts,” he said, whereas what we need are “concepts newly 
fashioned by science for its own purpose.”4 These words seem as much in force today as they 
were when originally written. Lacking a designated, operationally defined vocabulary, the study of 
humans remains plagued by resilient dilemmas. Just look at time-honored controversies about 
human development that recur time and again, alas in different disguises, throughout history. 
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Take, for example, the famous “nature versus nurture” dilemma, “mind and body” problem or 
the controversy about the “transfer of learning.” All these quandaries have an appearance of 
disagreements about empirical facts, but may, in reality, be a matter of lexical ambiguities. The 
blurriness of the vocabulary is the most obvious explanation for our inability to overcome the 
differences and build on each other’s work: Unknown to ourselves, we are likely to be using the 
same words – nature, nurture, mind, transfer – in different ways. Similarly, our inability to capture 
the complexity of human phenomena may well be a matter of an inadequacy of our analytic 
methods, the weakness that, in the absence of explicit, operational definitions, seems incurable.  
At a closer look, the lack of operationality is only the beginning of the researcher’s 
problem. Without clear definitions, one is left at the mercy of metaphors, that is, of concepts 
created by transferring familiar words into unfamiliar territories. Indeed, if we are able to use 
words such as nurture or transfer in the context of human learning and development, it is 
because both these terms are known to us from everyday discourse. The services rendered by 
metaphors, however, are not without a price: together with the unwritten guidelines for how 
to incorporate the old term into new contexts come hordes of unforeseen metaphorical 
entailments, some of which may interfere with the task of gaining useful insights into the 
observed phenomena. Whereas the use of metaphor cannot be barred – after all, this is one 
of the principal mechanisms of discourse building – the risks of metaphorical projections 
may be considerably reduced by providing the metaphorically engendered notions with 
operational definitions.  
Being explicit and operational about one’s own use of word, however, is not an easy 
matter. Some people circumvent the challenge by turning to numbers. Precise measurement 
seems such an obvious antidote to the uncertainties of descriptive narratives! Rather than merely 
describing what the child does when grappling with mathematical problems, those who speak 
“numerese” would look at students’ solutions, divide them in categories and check distributions. 
Rather than scrutinizing the utterances of a girl executing an arithmetic operations they would 
measure her IQ, consider her grades and decide whether the numbers justify labeling her as 
“learning disabled.” Never mind the fact that in the quantitative discourse the numbers may be 
originating in categorizations as under-defined as those that belong to its “qualitative” 
counterpart (after all, there is no reason to assume that the words signifying things to be 
counted, when not defined in operational terms, are more operational than any other.) Forget the 
fact that in their zeal to bring simplicity, order and unification, the quantitatively minded 
interlocutors are likely to gloss over potentially significant individual differences. It is only too 
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tempting to believe that numbers can say it all and that when they speak, there is no need to 
worry about words. 
 I do worry about words, though, and this book is the result of this concern. In spite of 
my liking for numbers – after all, I am the native of mathematics – I am acutely aware of the 
perils of the purely numerical talk. The uneasy option of operationalizing the discourse about 
uniquely human forms of life seem the only alternative. On the following pages, I take a close 
look at the basics terms such as thinking, learning and communication and try to define them with the 
help of clear, publicly accessible criteria. If this operationalizing effort raises some brows – if 
somebody protests saying that thinking and communication are natural phenomena and thus not 
anything that people should bother to define – let me remind that defining regards the ways we 
talk about the world, not the world as such, and it is up to us, not to the nature, to decide how to 
match our words with phenomena. And to the readers who feel that I try to tell them how to 
talk let me explain that this, too, is not the case. All I want is to be understood the way I 
intended, on my own terms. For me, being explicit about my use of words is simply a matter of 
“conceptual accountability,” of being committed to, and responsible for, effectiveness of my 
communication with others. 
 The conceptualization I am about to propose may be regarded as an almost self-
imposing entailment of what was explicitly said by Vygotsky and what was implied by 
Wittgenstein. The point of departure is Vygotsky’s claim that historically established, collectively 
implemented activities are developmentally prior to all our uniquely human skills. Being one of 
these skills, human thinking must also have a collective predecessor. Obviously, interpersonal 
communication is the only candidate. In this book, therefore, thinking is defined as the 
individualized version of interpersonal communication – as a communicative interaction in which one 
person plays the roles of all interlocutors. The term commognition, a combination of communication 
and cognition comes to stress that inter-personal communication and individual thinking are two 
varieties of the same phenomenon.  
 In the nine chapters of this book, the introduction to  the commognitive perspective is 
accompanied by a careful examination of its theoretical consequences and of its implications for 
research and for educational practice. The task is implemented in two steps. Part I (chapters 1 
through 4) is devoted to the double project of telling a story of human thinking and creating a 
language in which this story may usefully be told.  After presenting a number of time-honored 
controversies regarding human learning and problem solving (Chapter 1), and after tracing the 
roots of these quandaries to certain linguistic ambiguities (Chapter 2), the commognitive vision is 
introduced as a possible cure for at least some of the persistent dilemmas and uncertainties 
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(Chapter 3). Although it is repeatedly stressed that language is not the only medium in which 
communication may take place, it is now claimed that verbal communication may well be the 
primary source of the distinctively human forms of life (Chapter 4.) Indeed, if one was to name a 
single feature that would set human kind apart from all the others in the eyes of a hypothetical 
extraterrestrial observer, the most likely choice would be our ability to accumulate complexity of 
action, that is, the fact that our forms of life, unlike those of other species, evolve and grow in 
intricacy and sophistication from one generation to another, constantly redefining the nature and 
range of individual development. It may now be argued that this gradual growth is made possible 
by the fact that our activities are verbally mediated. More specifically, thanks to the special 
property of human language known as recursivity, the activity-mediating discourses, and the 
resulting texts, become the primary repository of the gradually increasing complexity. 
Consistently with this vision, research on human development becomes the study of the growth 
of discourses.  
In Part II I return to the questions that started me on this project: I use the 
commognitive lens to make sense of one special type of discourse called mathematical. By 
choosing mathematics I hope to be able to illustrate the power of commognitive framework with 
a particular clarity. Mathematical thinking has been psychologists' favorite object of study ever 
since the advent of the disciplined inquiry into human cognition.  Widely regarded as perhaps the 
most striking instantiation of the human capacity for abstraction and complexity, mathematics is 
also a paragon of rigor and clarity: It is decomposable into relatively neatly delineated, 
hierarchically organized layers that allow for many different levels of engagement and 
performance. The tradition of using mathematics as a medium within which to address general 
questions about human thinking goes back to Jean Piaget,5 and continues with the wide variety 
of developmental psychologists and misconceptions seekers, ending up, at least for now, with 
the sociocultural thinkers who vowed to reclaim the place of the social within the time honored 
trinity world-society-individual.6 Throughout history, students of human mind were often divided 
on questions of epistemology, methodology and of the meaning of observed phenomena, but 
they always agreed that mathematical thinking is a perfect setting for uncovering general truths 
about human development7.  
In the four chapters devoted to mathematical thinking, I develop the commognitive 
vision of mathematics as a type of discourse – as a well-defined form of communication, made 
distinct by its vocabulary, visual mediators, routines and the narratives it produces (Chapter 5). 
The questions of the nature and origins of the objects of mathematical discourse is then 
addressed, and the claim is made that mathematics is an autopoietic discourse – one that spurs its 
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own development and produces its own objects (Chapter 6). I follow with the questions of the 
uniquely mathematical ways of communicating (Chapter 7) and of the goals and gains of 
communicating in these special ways (Chapter 8). All along, particular attention is given to the 
question of how mathematical discourse comes into being and how and why it subsequently 
evolves. The vision of mathematics as a discourse, and thus as a form of human activity, makes it 
possible to identify mechanisms that are common to the historical development of mathematics 
and to its individual learning.  Having stated all this, I return to the initial quandaries and ask 
myself whether the commognitive vision brought the wished-for resolution. At the same time, I 
wonder about a series of new puzzles, some of them already being taken care of and some others 
still waiting to be transformed into researcheable questions (Chapter 9.) 
All along the book, theoretical musings are interspersed with numerous empirical 
instantiations. Although the examples are mostly mathematical, they are rather elementary and 
easily accessible to anybody who knows a thing or two about the basic arithmetic. The 
mathematical slant, therefore, should not deter non-mathematical readers, not even those who 
suffer from mathematical anxiety. It is also worth mentioning that the book may be read in 
different ways, depending on one’s needs and foci. Those interested mainly in theorizing about 
human thinking may satisfy themselves with Part I, where references to mathematics are scarce. 
Those who reach for this book because of their interest in mathematical thinking, can head 
directly toward Part II. The glossary in the end of the volume will help them, if necessary, with 
concise explanations of basic terms and tenets. 
****** 
Once we agree that thinking is an individualized form of interpersonal communication, we must 
also concede that whatever one creates is a product of collective doing. Even when sitting alone 
at her desk and deeply immersed in thoughts, a person is engaged in a conversation with others. 
Like any human artifact, this book is thus full of “echoes and reverberations” of conversations 
that took place at different times and places, involving people whom I never met, and probably 
many others of whom I haven’t even heard. Being “filled with others' words”8 this text has 
therefore more contributors than I am aware of.  While echoing other peoples’ words or when 
taking exception with what they said I dragged them into this conversation, sometimes 
intentionally and sometimes unconsciously. If their roles were revealed, not all of these 
involuntary contributors would agree to take any credit for the final product. Nevertheless, I 
would dearly like to acknowledge them all. Unfortunately, I can express my gratitude only to 
those few people of whose contribution I am aware, hoping to be forgiven by all the others.  
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Let me begin, therefore, with Lev Vygotsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein, two giants whose 
shoulders proved wide enough to accommodate legions of followers and a wide variety of 
interpreters. Although libraries have already been filled with exegetic treatises, the Byelorussian 
psychologist and the Austrian-born philosopher continue to inspire new ideas even as I am 
writing these lines. This, it seems, is due to one important feature their writings have in common: 
rather than provide information, the two authors address the reader as a partner in thinking; 
rather than presenting a completed edifice with all the scaffolding removed, they extend an 
invitation for a guided tour of the construction site; rather than imposing firm convictions, they 
share the “doubt that comes after belief.”9 These two writers had a major impact on my thinking; 




























                                                 
         1 Rorty, 1979, pp. 389-390  
 2 Vygotsky, 1978, p. 19  
   3 ibid  
4 Wittgenstein, 1980, [Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. II. 1948, German-English parallel text; 
Edited by G.H. Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Oxford: Balckwell; §62]  
5 E.g. Piaget, 1952  
6 E.g. Lave, 1988; Walkerdine, 1988  
7 H. J. Reed and J. Lave (1979) make a compelling case for using mathematics as a “laboratory” for studying 
human thinking in the article with the tale-telling title “Arithmetic as a tool for investigating the relation 
between culture and cognition” (American Ethnologist, 6, 568-582). 
8 Bakhtin, 1999, p. 130 [Bakhtin, M.M. (1999), The problem of speech genres. In A. Jaworski & N. Coupland (Eds), The 
discursive reader (pp. 121-132). London: Routledge.]  
9 Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 23e [Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.]  
